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What is a duty of justice? And how is it different from a duty of beneficence? We need a clear 
account of the contrast. Unfortunately, there is no consensus in the philosophical literature as to 
how to characterize it. Different articulations of it have been provided, but it is hard to identify a 
common core that is invariant across them. In this paper, I propose an account of how to 
understand duties of justice, explain how it contrasts with several proposals as to how to 
distinguish justice and beneficence, respond to some objections and suggest further elaborations 
of it. The conceptual exploration pursued in this paper has practical stakes. A central aim is to 
propose and defend a capacious concept of justice that makes a direct discussion of important 
demands of justice (domestic and global) possible. Duties of justice can be positive besides 
negative, they can be imperfect as well as perfect, they can range over personal besides 
institutional contexts, they can include multiple associative reasons such us non-domination, non-
exploitation and reciprocity, and they can even go beyond existing national, political, and 
economic associative frameworks to embrace strictly universal humanist concerns. We should 
reject ideological abridgments of the concept of justice that render these possibilities, and the 
important human interests and claims they may foster, invisible. 
 
1. Introduction 
It is common to assume that there is an important distinction between justice and beneficence (or 
charity, humanitarianism—I treat them as equivalent here). This distinction between duties to 
others seems important, for example, when we think about our distributive responsibilities. Some 
believe that certain duties to help the needy or the relatively poor are duties of justice, whereas 
others claim that they are only duties of beneficence. Some believe that some of those duties are 
duties of justice in domestic, but not in global contexts. But what is a duty of justice? And how is 
it different from a duty of beneficence? We need a clear account of the contrast. Unfortunately, 
there is no consensus in the philosophical literature as to how to characterize it. Different 
articulations of it have been provided, but it is hard to identify a common core that is invariant 
across them. In this paper, I propose an account of how to understand duties of justice (section 2), 
explain how it contrasts with several proposals as to how to distinguish justice and beneficence 
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(section 3), and respond to some objections and suggest further elaborations of it (section 4). My 
focus will largely be on distributive justice (i.e. on the just apportioning of access to material 
goods and conditions affecting subsistence or well-being, including for example housing, health 
care, education, alimentation, opportunities for productive and meaningful work, income and 
wealth, instruments of production, and natural resources). 
 The conceptual exploration pursued in this paper has practical stakes. A central aim is to 
propose and defend a capacious concept of justice that makes a direct discussion of important 
demands of justice (domestic and global) possible. Duties of justice can be positive besides 
negative, they can be imperfect as well as perfect, they can range over personal besides 
institutional contexts, they can include multiple associative reasons such as non-domination, non-
exploitation and reciprocity, and they can even go beyond existing national, political, and 
economic associative frameworks to embrace strictly universal humanist concerns. We should 
reject ideological abridgments of the concept of justice that render these possibilities, and the 
important human interests and claims they may foster, invisible. 
 
2. A proposal for how to understand duties of justice 
Let me start by presenting my view about how to understand duties of justice. I suggest that we 
conceive of them as follows: 
Duties of justice are duties to preserve or promote people’s access to important conditions or 
goods to which they are entitled and whose fulfillment is prima facie enforceable. This 
enforcement is all things considered justifiable if it is necessary for or strongly contributes to 
securing the required preservation or promotion and can be feasibly introduced without 
imposing unreasonable costs.  
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There are different ways to develop this concept into a more specific conception of justice.1 That 
development would involve providing substantive accounts answering questions such as the 
following: What conditions or goods are important enough to give rise to rights and duties of 
justice?2 What duties of preservation or promotion are reasonable to accept? What makes a 
proposed form of enforcement necessary for or strongly contributory to the fulfillment of a right? 
What considerations bear on the appraisal of the feasibility and reasonable costs of the 
enforcement of a duty? What areas of social life are amenable to demands of justice (i.e. what is 
justice’s site)? What are the criteria for identifying duty-bearers and right-holders (i.e. what is 
justice’s scope)? Different conceptions of justice can differ in their answers to these questions 
while sharing the concept as characterized above. They can agree on the role of justice in 
identifying prima facie enforceable duties to secure people’s rights even if they disagree about 
what makes duties fit for that role. I will explain these points further in section 3. But before 
proceeding let me say something about the status of my discussion. 
 The account of the concept of duties of justice just provided is neither a stipulation nor an 
elucidation, but something in between these that we can call a deliberative interpretive proposal. 
A deliberative interpretive proposal shares with elucidation the interpretive interest in relating the 
account of a concept to the practices in which that concept may be used. But it differs from 
elucidation (and gets closer to stipulation) in that its core aim is deliberative rather than 
descriptive: it does not merely report what some agents in fact think, but makes a suggestion as to 
what they are to think. The aim is to propose an understanding of justice that relates to certain 
practices in which elements of the concept may be already in use, or where the concept may be 
relevant, while offering an articulation of the concept that may improve on the current concept or 
its understanding and thus help ameliorate the practice itself.  
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 In proposing and defending the deliberative interpretive proposal mentioned, it is helpful to 
proceed by considering some reasonable desiderata, or adequacy conditions, for an account of 
duties of justice. What do we want to achieve by identifying some duties as duties of justice? 
What theoretical and practical work would a distinction between such duties and duties of 
beneficence do for us? The following are some of the desiderata I think worth recognizing (I do 
not claim that this list is exhaustive): 
(a) Capturing the stringency of justice. Justice involves demands that are very strong and that 
normally override competing considerations. An account of justice should pick out this 
feature. 
(b) Enabling rather than suppressing substantive debates. We should not propose an 
understanding of the concept of justice that is so narrow that it renders important 
substantive debates about duties of justice irrelevant. We want to engage intelligently in 
those debates and to reach a considered view about what position to support. Eliminating 
options by definitional fiat impoverishes our practical reasoning. 
(c) Determinateness. Our understanding of justice should be tolerably determinate. Ideally, we 
should identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the concept of 
justice. Failing that, we should at least identify typical features holding for an important 
range of cases.3 
(d) Capturing the critical role of justice. Conceptions of justice have a practical role in 
criticizing social practices and institutions. We should be suspicious of accounts of justice 
that do not help us make sense of challenges to the status quo. 
(e) Illuminating practices. Our account of the concept of justice should help us clarify the 
stakes of important practical questions.  
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3. How the proposed account relates to several proposals as to how to distinguish justice 
from beneficence 
The following are the main contrasts that have been proposed to identify the specificity of duties 
of justice: 
I. Due. Duties of justice, unlike duties of beneficence, are concerned with giving people their 
due. 
II. Negative / Positive. Duties of justice are negative, whereas duties of beneficence are 
positive (the former demand that we avoid depriving others of access to certain important 
conditions or goods, while the latter demand that we provide them with such an access or 
protect them when they already have it). 
III. Perfect / Imperfect. Duties of justice are perfect, whereas duties of beneficence are 
imperfect (the former are, and the latter are not, such that it is always clear who owes what 
to whom in what circumstances). 
IV. Enforceability. Duties of justice are justifiably enforceable, whereas duties of beneficence 
are not. 
V. Rights. Duties of justice have correlative rights, whereas duties of beneficence do not. 
VI. Institutional / Personal. Duties of justice are institutional, whereas duties of beneficence 
are interpersonal. 
VII. Associative / Non-associative. Duties of justice are always associative (they hold only 
amongst those who share a certain associative framework—such as a system of economic 
cooperation, a state, etc.), whereas duties of beneficence (sometimes) are not.4 
The understanding of justice I proposed in section 2 combines some elements of contrasts I, IV, 
and V (although, as it will become clear, it does not collapse into any of them). On this 
understanding, duties of justice range over what is due to people. Just distribution is a response to 
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people’s rights to what is distributed. And distribution warrants enforcement. Such enforcement 
is seen as only prima facie warranted, however. Enforcement imposes constraints on the freedom 
of agents and involves burdens for them, and such costs must themselves be justifiable as feasible 
and reasonable. Hence, a duty could be a duty of justice even if a specific implementation of it is 
not justifiably enforceable, all things considered, in certain circumstances (either because in the 
circumstances such an enforcement is not feasible or because it imposes costs that are 
unreasonable given other, stronger, conflicting demands of justice). But since a pro tanto ground 
for action persists, agents may have to find alternative (feasible, reasonable) ways to honor it, or 
change the circumstances so that some form of honoring the ground becomes practicable. 
 Consider, for example, the duty to help eradicate severe poverty. Access to basic nutrition, 
housing, education, and medical care constitute urgent interests that give rise to rights. The 
fulfillment of the correlative negative duty not to deprive others of access to basic necessities is 
clearly worthy of enforcement. So arguably is a positive duty to help others gain and maintain 
such an access. Now, the latter duty is clearly feasible at reasonable cost in most contemporary 
societies. It could be argued that this is not the case in extremely poor societies where corruption 
and lack of economic dynamism are rampant. If this is true, agents in poor societies still have a 
duty to improve their political institutions and bolster their economic development so that more 
poverty can be eliminated. And the members of wealthier societies have duties to facilitate, and 
of course also not to block, such improvement. They may have to stop using international 
institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Trade Organization) as tools 
for dominating and exploiting poorer societies, and help turn them into tools for expanding the 
opportunities of the poor to escape penury. 
 I will defend the proposed view of duties of justice by explaining how it relates to the seven 
contrasts mentioned. In doing this, I will draw on the five desiderata listed in section 2. I will 
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argue that my proposed account satisfies the desiderata, that it does not neatly coincide with any 
of the traditional contrasts, and that none of the contrasts fulfills all the desiderata. The text in 
this section partly draws on, but systematically revises and expands, the discussion on the 
contrast between justice and humanitarianism presented in section 1.6 of my book From Global 
Poverty to Global Equality.5 
(i) Capturing the stringency of justice 
A common intuition is that duties of justice are particularly stringent moral demands. Many agree 
with the view that, as Adam Swift puts it, “[p]olitical philosophy … is a very specific subset of 
moral philosophy, and one where the stakes are particularly high. It’s not just about what people 
ought to do, it’s about what people are morally permitted, and sometimes morally required, to 
make each other do”.6 The account I suggested captures this by saying that duties of justice are 
prima facie enforceable. 
 However, it might be objected that my account does not fully capture the stringency of justice 
because it qualifies enforceability by reference to “reasonable costs” to duty bearers. This might 
seem to render duties of justice less stringent than their contrast with beneficence intuitively 
involves. On a construal of contrast IV (Enforceability), we would be problematically blurring 
the distinction between justice and beneficence if we allow duties of justice to turn out to be not 
enforceable given computation of costs. It would be better to deem such duties demands of 
beneficence, which are typically less stringent, and not necessarily enforceable. 
 To illustrate this objection, consider two scenarios. Both include duties whose fulfillment 
involves severe costs to the duty-bearer (such as their inability to pay for housing). The content 
of the duties in the two cases differs as follows. In the first, Federico pays back a loan to his 
creditor. In the second, Gillian helps several destitute people by giving them a considerable 
amount of money. According to the objection I am considering, it seems intuitively correct to 
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subject the second duty, but not the first, to a “reasonable costs” qualification, and this difference 
is one of the things we want to mark by calling the first a duty of justice and the second a duty of 
beneficence. The duty of beneficence to help the needy can be limited if its fulfillment involves 
the severe impoverishment of the duty-bearer, but this caveat does not apply to the duty of justice 
to pay back a loan. 
 The objection that taking demands of justice to be sensitive to costs would deprive them of 
their characteristic stringency (as opposed to the lesser stringency of beneficence) is mistaken. 
First, it seems reasonable that demands of justice be sensitive to costs. This is because justice 
should attend to the claims of everyone, including duty-bearers besides right-holders.7 Thus, we 
can reasonably reject the judgment that Federico should sell his home and liquidate all his assets 
and run to risk it all in a casino tonight even if doing this offers the only opportunity for him to 
raise enough money to make the payments that are due tomorrow. There may be extenuating 
circumstances such that someone’s debt payments may be justifiably lowered, or delayed, or 
cancelled. For example, they may cater for a sufficientarian norm of justice that no one should 
fall into destitution. Second, even if Gillian is permitted to refrain from giving so much money, 
she may still have some stringent and demanding duties toward the destitute. Consider the view 
that it is not wrong to tax people like Gillian to help the destitute. We think that the level of 
taxation should be determined not only by considering the potential beneficiaries of policies 
funded by taxation, but also by attending to the situation of those who would be taxed. This point, 
like the previous one, suggests that duties of justice and sensitivity to costs can legitimately be 
coupled.  
 Third, we can see some duties of justice as weightier than other duties without having to say 
that the latter are not duties of justice. There can be demands that outweigh, or even constrain, 
others, while being all demands of justice. It is of course often difficult to determine the precise 
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relations among different demands of justice, but we can recognize the general point that a 
plurality of them warranting prima facie enforcement exists. We can then envisage appropriate 
articulations in particular exercises. A clear and familiar example is Rawls’s “lexical ordering” of 
his two principles of justice. The first principle protecting equal civil and political liberties 
constrains the second principle promoting economic justice, and the part of the second principle 
concerning fair equality of opportunity constrains the other part (the “Difference Principle”) 
demanding the maximization of income for the worst-off.8 
 There is a common view according to which duties of justice normally have logical priority 
over duties of beneficence because the former, unlike the latter, are constitutive of an account of 
what is rightfully owned.9 Beneficence focuses on what people should do with what is theirs, 
assuming an account of what belongs to whom. Now, the account proposed here agrees with this 
view. Some positive duties to help others can be the counterpart of their positive entitlements. 
We can then justify the claim that rich people like Warren Buffett should be taxed to fund public 
education for children from destitute families by saying that the destitute children are entitled to 
the part of the rich’s pre-tax income that could be used to support them. 
(ii) Enabling rather than suppressing substantive debates 
A common temptation that should be resisted is to define disputed terms in ways that make some 
substantive claims couched in such terms impossible. This maneuver or shortcut does not solve 
substantive problems. The positions rendered definitionally impossible will simply reassert 
themselves through challenges to the definitions proposed, or by disputing the weight in our 
overall reasoning of the claims using the terms as defined. 
 Consider contrast II (Negative / Positive). On this contrast, no thing is a duty of justice unless 
it is a negative duty or a derivative of it. Thus, there is a negative duty of justice not to deprive 
others of the means of survival. There is no positive duty of justice to provide them with such 
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means (unless such provision is a form of compensation for previous deprivations, or the 
counterpart of a promise or a contract whose violation would flout a negative duty). Now, this 
view of justice as based on negative duties should be seen as a substantive conception of justice, 
not as a claim about the concept of justice. If the latter were asserted, this would beg the question 
against those who say that people like Warren Buffett have positive duties of justice to contribute 
to the subsistence of the destitute. If those who think that there are underived positive duties of 
justice were told that they are thinking about duties of beneficence rather than justice, they will 
contest the definition of the former as unduly narrow. Alternatively, they will say that duties of 
justice do not have the primacy often claimed for them (so that an alleged negative duty of justice 
not to tax Warren Buffett to help the destitute would be outweighed by a positive duty of 
beneficence to make him help them, even if this involves taxing Buffett). Hence it is better to 
keep the definition of justice broad enough to make room for substantive debate. Thus, a 
libertarian view of all fundamental duties of justice as negative should be seen as a substantive 
theory of justice, not simply as a definition of the concept of justice.10 A defense of it through a 
definitional maneuver would be a Pyrrhic victory. 
 Does what I have just said warrant the rejection of contrast II? A defender of this contrast 
could reply that we should accept it because of its fit with the first desideratum concerning the 
stringency of justice. This is because a negative duty regarding a certain object is normally 
weightier than a positive duty regarding the same object. Stealing food from the hungry is worse 
than refraining from giving them food. But this rebuttal is unsatisfactory. First, it does not ground 
a general claim of supremacy of negative over positive duties (which seems necessary for 
contrast II to hold). A negative duty regarding a certain object may have less moral weight than 
another positive duty regarding another object when the two conflict in practice. My duty not to 
deprive you of access to an object you own without your consent may have less weight than my 
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duty to save someone’s life. This is so, for example, when I can only take a mortally wounded 
person to the hospital by taking your car. Second, some negative duties may be weightier than 
positive duties with the same object without this entailing that the former are, and the latter are 
not, duties of justice. Even if they have unequal weight, both duties may be sufficiently weighty 
to be duties of justice.  Thus, the duty to help secure educational opportunities for destitute 
children may have less weight than the duty to refrain from prohibiting destitute children from 
attending school, but it may be weighty enough to justify taxing Warren Buffett to fund its 
implementation. 
 The account I have proposed is broad enough to enable the substantive discussion that contrast 
II represses. Similar considerations apply regarding contrasts IV and VI. Consider contrast IV 
(Enforceability). The problem with this contrast is that justifiable enforceability is neither 
sufficient nor necessary for something to be a duty of justice. Some contributions could be 
justifiably enforced without being duties of justice. For example, Allen Buchanan has argued that 
some forms of enforcement can be seen as securing the provision of certain collective goods that 
do not respond to correlative rights. Buchanan’s discussion of this thesis may be problematic, as 
the collective goods he mentions—clean air, energy conservation, national defense—may in fact 
be the objects of rights.11 But we can imagine cases in which rights are not involved. An example 
might be the promotion of certain cultural practices of the kind Rawls discusses when he 
identifies the tasks of a hypothetical “exchange branch” of the state in a well-ordered society.12 
An instance of this is public funding for opera houses. Another example might be some forms of 
renewed assistance to people who repeatedly and blamably squander the resources they receive.13 
Justifiable coercion is also not a necessary condition for justice. Sometimes coercive enforcement 
of certain demands may be all things considered unreasonable. An example of debate over this 
issue concerns the introduction of “speech codes” that impose penalties on agents performing 
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speech acts that carry clearly racist or sexist content. Some argue that although people have a 
duty of justice not to speak to others in racist or sexist ways, it would be overall a bad idea to 
have the state patrol linguistic practice. This position might be mistaken, but it is not 
conceptually incoherent. 
 What explains the wide support for contrast IV? It seems to me that at least part of this support 
depends on the important intuition that demands of justice are strong enough for their 
enforcement to warrant serious consideration because of the involvement of rights claims. The 
reference to rights establishes a strong, stringent ground for proposals of enforcement that is 
lacking in cases of beneficence. But my proposed account captures this point while avoiding the 
pitfalls of IV by seeing enforceability as being only prima facie and conditional upon 
considerations of feasibility and reasonable costs. Proposals of enforcement can be rejected when 
they involve unreasonable costs, or when they would not really help fulfill a relevant duty. 
 The point just made also affects some versions of contrast VI (Institutional / Personal) that see 
justice as only ranging over coercive institutions. As G. A. Cohen has argued, some duties of 
justice that constitute the ethos or moral culture of a just society may inform choices by 
individuals that are beyond the purview of coercive legal structures.14 A society without a racist 
culture would in one respect be more just than a society with a racist culture even if the coercive 
institutions of both societies were the same.  
 An institutionalist about justice could reply that the importance of an ethos for justice can be 
accounted for while insisting that only institutions populate the primary focus of demands of 
justice. This is because institutions have significant cultural effects and can thus help shape a 
society’s ethos.15 This true and important point is not however sufficient to justify an exclusive 
primary focus on institutions. One reason for this is that the relation between a society’s 
institutions and its culture is one of reciprocal rather than unidirectional influence. A certain 
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cultural environment may be necessary for certain institutions to arise in the first place. This 
point is crucial when we address the (relatively underexplored) issue of the accessibility of just 
institutions besides the (often explored) issue of their stability. The latter can to a large extent be 
accounted for by considering how just institutions shape political culture by socializing people in 
certain ways. But the former cannot readily be accounted for in this way. An important part of the 
struggle for justice in unjust societies is the generation of a sufficiently strong political will 
supporting reform, and this often involves an ideological battle in civil society through which 
political actors succeed in shaping practical attitudes of large sectors of society before new, just 
institutions formalizing the spirit of those attitudes are introduced. A striking example of this is 
the long cultural struggle by feminists before legal frameworks implementing nondiscrimination 
were established.16  Furthermore, it is worth noting that some demands of justice are directly 
rather than indirectly focused on people’s informal attitudes and choices in their interactions with 
each other. Daily, informal interactions in which persons address each other with respect are part 
of what a just society consists in. Even if institutions were enough to shape such attitudes 
(something I find unlikely to be true17), their role would be partly instrumental, and thus not 
wholly constitutive of the primary focus of justice, as holders of contrast VI seem to assume. 
(iii) Determinateness 
We want a concept of justice that is tolerably determinate. A difficulty with contrast I (Due) in 
this respect is that it does not fully capture the fact that duties of justice are different from other 
moral demands. The characterization of justice as giving people their due is too broad. On this 
account, most moral duties could be seen as a duty of justice, as most actions that are moral 
duties (rather than, say, something that would be praiseworthy but not wrong not to do), could be 
construed as delivering what is due, or owed, to someone. Consider the duties to fulfill the 
following promises: to call you on Wednesday to go to the cinema and to pay back the money 
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you loaned me at the agreed upon time. Both duties involve my giving you what is due to you. 
But the first, unlike the second, does not strike us as a good candidate for a duty of justice. 
 As I said in section 2, my proposal partly absorbs contrast V (Rights) because it sees duties of 
justice as responding to correlative rights. However, my proposal does not simply collapse into 
this contrast. One reason is that, as we saw, it also refers to prima facie enforceability. Doing this 
makes the concept of justice more determinate. Not every right warrants demands of justice. 
Some moral rights (such as your right that your friend show up at the cinema at the agreed upon 
time) may not be even prima facie justifiably enforceable.  
 On the other hand, we should not be too strict about determinateness because this may lead to 
overlooking important moral issues. Consider for example a version of contrast III (and a view of 
contrast V that is tied to it), according to which someone’s right to an object is only linked to 
duties of justice on the part of someone else if those duties are perfect (if they are duties to do 
certain clearly specified things to preserve or promote access to that object by the right-holder). 
This seems to me to be an unduly narrow account of rights that impoverishes our thinking about 
them. It overlooks the possibility that we can identify rights with different levels of precision, so 
that some rights may correlate to both perfect and imperfect duties.18 Take for example a right to 
health care. Governments have perfect duties not to arbitrarily deprive any resident of access to 
existing public heath care programs. They may not, for example, discriminate on the basis of 
political opinion, race, ethnicity, or gender. But surely governments also have a duty to create 
some needed health care programs that do not yet exist. This duty is imperfect because it is 
indeterminate as to what programs of the many that are possible should be chosen (when not all 
can be feasibly and readily introduced at reasonable cost). It can be made more determinate at the 
level of policy. But its more general and imperfect (and thus somewhat indeterminate) form is 
itself significant. It is one of the reasonable counterparts of a constitution that includes social 
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rights, and citizens and courts could press governments to acknowledge it and take steps to fulfill 
it in some of the many ways possible.19 
 Thus, the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties does not provide a model for the 
distinction between justice and beneficence. As we saw, there can be duties of justice that are 
imperfect. As an additional and important example, consider the duty to contribute to institutional 
change in an unjust society. This is one of the “natural duties of justice” for individuals 
mentioned by Rawls in A Theory of Justice.20 It is clearly imperfect because it does not by itself 
specify what, and how much, any person should do to fight injustice.21 Furthermore, there may be 
duties of beneficence that are perfect. An example could be a duty to help certain people escape 
circumstances of severe deprivation when they can only do so with our help, they are the only 
ones who need our help, we can help at reasonable cost, and the deprivation they face is the result 
of their repeatedly squandering resources previously received (perhaps in fulfillment of duties of 
sufficientarian or egalitarian justice).  
(iv) Capturing the critical role of justice 
A fourth desideratum in accounting for duties of justice is that we avoid automatic deference to 
the status quo. A critical and dynamic attitude toward our current circumstances is among the 
crucial things we expect the standpoint of justice to help us achieve. An important case in this 
respect is the ability to support dynamic duties to expand current feasible sets of political action 
so that certain just distributions that are infeasible (or have very low feasibility) in the present 
become feasible (or more feasible) in the future.22 This helps notice a further problem with 
contrast III (Perfect / Imperfect). For example, it would be a mistake to say that there is not a duty 
of justice to help eradicate global poverty because it is currently unclear who should do what for 
whom, or because we currently do not have international institutions scheduling and enforcing 
specific forms of contribution securing the eradication of poverty for all. Currently imperfect 
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duties can, and often should, be made perfect through the generation of new forms of collective 
action and institutional structures articulating specific provisions.23 It is not unreasonable to see 
the introduction of such articulation as a demand of justice. But its ground may be the importance 
of the pre-existing imperfect duty of justice to eradicate poverty that such articulation would help 
specify and implement. It would have been a worrisome capitulation to the status quo to deny the 
existence of these demands before the construction of welfare states in domestic contexts. A 
similar mistake at the global level could and arguably should be avoided. 
 The identification of perfect duties and the existence of institutional mechanisms are 
extremely important. They can foster efficiency by coordinating the action of many agents, they 
can help identify a fair allocation of responsibilities given agents’ diverse needs, abilities, and 
associative relations, and they can cement motivation to comply for those who are not 
sufficiently morally motivated and for those who need assurance that others will also do their 
share. Thus, we do need to focus extensively on institutional structures when we develop a 
conception of justice. (Of course, their coercive nature besides their far-reaching influence also 
makes their justifiability an important concern.24) But this does not entail that there could be no 
duties of justice that are not already institutionally specified. This point obviously affects some 
versions of contrast VI (Institutional / Personal) in addition to contrast III (Perfect / Imperfect). 
We have already identified several reasons for rejecting the reduction of duties of justice to 
institutionally articulated duties. Another reason that relates to the desiderata of avoiding 
question-begging views and the critical role of justice is the following. It is not a conceptual 
impossibility to think of a just society that has no robust, or coercive, institutional structure. An 
example might be an anarchist society securing liberty and equality for all through arrangements 
that are thoroughly voluntary.25 Although such a society is hardly achievable, its characterization 
as just is not a conceptual mistake. Furthermore, a picture of it may work as an ideal with the 
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help of which other, more feasible social structures can be evaluated and compared. Some may 
turn out to be preferable if they approximate the ideal more closely than others.  
(v) Illuminating practices 
A further desideratum for an understanding of justice is that it should help us make sense of 
problems in current political practices. For example, an understanding of distributive justice as 
ranging over enforceable rights is in tune with the modern emergence of the view that duties to 
eradicate severe poverty and reduce inequality are among the key responsibilities of states.26 This 
desideratum should also apply to the current debate on global justice, in which we can identify 
two important shifts. They involve the emergence of discussions over whether responsibilities of 
justice can rely on associative relations different from co-membership of a state and on humanist 
claims concerning important interests of human beings regardless of associative ties. Both shifts 
involve a departure from a narrow construal of justice which, as a variant of contrast VI 
(Institutional / Personal), holds that two persons can have duties of distributive justice toward 
each other only if they are both subject to state institutions that act coercively and in their name.27 
 The first shift involves the view that two persons may share duties of distributive justice if 
they are intertwined in associative frameworks that are less comprehensive than a state but are 
still morally consequential.28 A typical example concerns relations of deep economic 
interdependence. Their existence may give rise to duties to avoid exploitation of members of 
poorer societies (for example through unfair bargaining mechanisms in international institutions 
such as the World Trade Organization, or through humiliating labor conditions in sweatshops run 
by multinational corporations in relatively poor countries). 
 The previous shift is compatible with contrast VII (Associative / Non-associative), but 
demands a wider view of the kinds of associative facts that give rise to concerns of distributive 
justice. The second shift is more radical, and challenges it. According to this contrast distributive 
	   18	  
justice is confined to duties arising among co-members of already existing associations 
(economic, political, national, etc.). On this contrast, a humanist view of justice according to 
which some duties of justice correlate to rights that protect interests that human beings as such 
have is a category mistake. But such a humanist view is an important strand in the contemporary 
theory and practice of global justice. Universal sufficientarian claims against severe poverty are a 
central part of human rights discourse. And some philosophers are starting to argue that some 
egalitarian demands regarding some goods (such as health care, education, and work 
opportunities) can also take non-associativist forms. If we recognize that all human persons are 
ultimate units of equal moral concern and respect for everyone, then we might entertain the 
thought that we have duties to help others access important advantages even if due to the natural 
lottery they were born outside of our associative networks.29 This view has practical significance 
for debates about the strength and content of global duties of aid, and about the extent to which 
borders should be open to immigrants. 
 The desideratum of illuminating current political practice would be flouted if we work with a 
concept of justice that does not help us grasp these shifts as expressing valid moves in the debate 
about what justice demands. The desiderata concerning the critical and dynamic role of 
considerations of justice and concerning the need to avoid begging important substantive 
questions should also make us suspicious of an understanding of justice based on contrast VII. 
Eliminating humanist conceptions through a definitional maneuver would be philosophically 
unsatisfactory. It would also uncritically defer to the status quo, which includes on the part of 
many the belief that they do not have duties of justice tracking rights of human beings who are 
not already co-members in some parochial association. To reach a considered view about what is 
the just way to approach the ongoing process of globalization, we need to be able to raise and 
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assess diverse associativist and humanist proposals. And to enable that discussion, we need a 
capacious concept of justice like the one I proposed. 
 
4. Objections and elaborations 
I conclude by considering some possible objections to, and elaborations of, the account of duties 
of justice presented above. 
(1) A first worry is that the reference to “important conditions or goods” in the characterization of 
duties and rights of justice may not be necessary. Imagine a contract between Juan and Peter in 
which Peter commits to giving Juan a massage for a fee. Juan is entitled to Peter’s massage, and 
perhaps Peter can be said to have a duty of justice to honor the contract. But the good involved is 
not important. 
 In response, we can make two points. First, we can consider specific rights and duties as cases 
of wider principles. In the example discussed, we can consider the importance of making and 
honoring contracts. Having access to successful practices of this kind is clearly an important 
good. Alternatively, it could be that some instances of a practice are relatively unimportant (as in 
the example above) while others are quite important (as in, say, transfers of real estate or full-
time job contracts). We can then simply distinguish subsets of contract rights and duties, and say 
that only those ranging over sufficiently important goods give rise to rights and duties of justice. 
(The standard of “sufficient importance”, of course, is a matter of substantive conception, not of 
concept.) 
(2) Another worry targets the component of “prima facie enforceability” in the account of duties 
of justice proposed. The general difficulty concerns the explanatory significance of this 
component when contrasted with the other component referring to rights. It seems that in the 
order of explanation, something is a duty of justice because it protects or promotes the fulfillment 
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of an important right, and a duty is enforceable because it is a duty of justice. It does not seem 
true to say that something is a duty of justice because it is (inter alia) enforceable.  
 In response, I agree that referring to rights is explanatorily more important than referring to 
prima facie enforceability (this is why I said, in section 2, that enforcement is justifiable when—
inter alia—it is necessary or strongly contributory to the fulfillment of rights). But I think that 
both are explanatory significant. Prima facie enforceability is a dependent, but relevant 
component. This is because intuitively duties of justice involve, prima facie, justifiable 
limitations on people’s liberty to act. What the worry just mentioned forces me to acknowledge is 
that there is an explanatory structure within the account of justice such that the importance of the 
relevant rights determines (together with other considerations such as feasibility and reasonable 
costs) the justifiability of the enforcement of the duties to protect or promote their fulfillment. 
(3) The previous point helps me to address another worry, and to entertain a reformulation of the 
account proposed. The worry is that the account of justice proposed may force us to exclude 
imperfect duties from the domain of justice because they may be unenforceable even prima facie. 
If Gillian has an imperfect duty to help the destitute, she has discretion as to whom to help and 
how to do it. Given this discretion, we have no clear target for enforcement.30 
 A first response is that enforcement may still be possible when the duty-bearer has discretion. 
One way to do this is to demand that the agent show periodically, at defined times, that they have 
chosen some of the possible ways to fulfill their imperfect duty or face penalties. The agent still 
operates with a disjunctive set of possible ways to help (for example, they can help A or B or 
C…). But they can be asked to show that they have chosen at least one of the items in the 
disjunction. 
 There is also the option, considered above, of “perfecting” the imperfect duty through 
institutional specification by for example demanding that Gillian pay taxes, which are in turn 
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used to fund specific policies of aid for certain individuals. But important as it is, this solution is 
partial, as there will still be some additional duties that remain imperfect. The choice by officials 
of relevant policies to assist the destitute may itself involve some discretion. This point has been 
overlooked by proponents of the strategy of “perfecting duties.” Here the imperfection is 
eliminated at one level but at the cost of generating it at another. Thus, this strategy cannot yield 
the elimination of imperfect duties. This circumstance is not, however, a source of despair if we 
reject contrast III, as I recommend in this paper. 
 There may be other cases in which certain duties are unenforceable because they are simply 
not the kind of thing that can be enforced and are, thus, not even prima facie candidates for 
enforcement. This might hold in the case of certain psychological and cultural traits and 
dispositions that are not directly under the voluntary control of agents (such as a spirited concern 
for the plight of the worse off, and a readiness to participate in democratic politics when there is 
no legal articulation of the relevant duties). But these phenomena can still be shaped, indirectly 
and over the long-term, by agents. We can increase the presence of such traits and dispositions 
through education, material incentives, and other mechanisms. And we can be under prima facie 
enforceable duties to support the use of those mechanisms. For example, we may have duties to 
publicly fund educational opportunities, democratize access to the mass media, and much else 
that affects people’s knowledge and attitudes. This is another case of application of the idea of 
dynamic duties (see 3.iv above). 
 A more radical response to the current worry would be to revise the account of duties of 
justice by relativizing the enforceability clause even further. In addition to seeing it as 
explanatorily dependent on the clause referring to important rights, we can see prima facie 
enforceability as typically, but not always or necessarily a feature of duties of justice. This could 
be a case in which strict analysis in terms of sufficient and necessary conditions breaks down, 
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and we rest content with identifying a set of typical features of a concept. On this weaker 
approach to conceptual inquiry, the characterizing features need not all hold in every case. 
Another possibility is to see enforceability as marking a species within the genus of justice (as 
pertaining, for example, to something that could be called “political” or “institutional justice”). 
(4) A further worry is that the acceptance of imperfect duties of justice is incompatible with the 
view that duties of justice correlate with rights. Some could argue that only duties that are clearly 
directed to specifiable claimants can correlate with rights. If Gillian can fulfill her duty to help 
some within a set of three persons, none of those persons has a claim against Gillian that they 
specifically be helped by her. 
 This challenge can be answered in many ways. Some were already mentioned (when referring 
to mechanisms for “perfecting” duties). But the issue of directedness can also be tackled by 
noticing that Gillian’s imperfect duty is in principle directed to all of the three potential 
beneficiaries. Each has a claim that they be considered as a potential beneficiary. None would be 
wronged by Gillian if another potential beneficiary is chosen in their stead (as Gillian is 
permitted to choose), but they would be wronged if they were not so considered, and, of course, 
if none of them were helped. If the relevant duty is primarily based on the importance to the 
destitute of avoiding their penury (rather than, say, on the sense of elevation that Gillian would 
get from helping) then the duty already has a direction toward right-holders. 
 Notice that this directedness should orient not only immediate responses in the present, but 
also strategies of action for the future. Besides having the normal duty to help some of the 
destitute now, Gillian, together with others, may have a dynamic duty to foster social 
arrangements under which all (or more) of the destitute get the help they need. 
 Another possible response is to adopt a narrow view of rights as bounded up with perfect 
duties but to relax their characterization. We could do what was suggested above when referring 
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to enforceability, and see claimability (narrowly conceived) as a typical, but not always 
necessary, feature of justice. 31 
 Still another response is to drop acceptance of imperfect duties as duties of justice. This would 
simplify the discussion in (3) and (4) because there would be no need to contest or revise the 
reference to any of the components of the account of duties of justice proposed. However, my 
current state of reflective equilibrium says that we should avoid the dramatic surgery involved in 
this suggestion. It would require, implausibly, that we omit from the set of duties of justice some 
that seem to be among their paradigmatic cases (such as the duty to contribute to the reform of 
unjust societies and to support just ones). 
(5) Another potential worry is that my account of justice is too beneficiary-centered. This 
impression might arise because rights are said to be based on the importance of certain conditions 
or goods to right-holders. This seems to omit consideration of the perspective of duty-bearers. 
But the interest of a putative right-holder in certain conditions or goods is not sufficient for 
grounding a right to it; we also need to show that the agents with the putative correlative duties of 
protection or promotion in fact ought to acknowledge such duties. 
 I agree that the perspective of duty-bearers is important in determining whether there is a right. 
Such a perspective is already taken into account when we see the enforceability of the 
implementation of demands of justice as depending on their feasibility and reasonable cost 
(which partly concern the duty-bearers’ ability to do what is demanded without shouldering 
unacceptable burdens). I now suggest that such concerns of feasibility and reasonable cost can 
also be seen to apply to the determination of the existence of the duties themselves. 
 We can bring the perspective of duty-bearers further into focus when developing a conception 
of rights. In my own view, we can proceed on the basis of the following schema: If A (a right-
holder) has a right to O (a certain object involving an important condition or good) against B (a 
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duty-bearer), then there are feasible and reasonable demands on B that they respect or promote, in 
some significant ways to be specified, A’s access to O. The specification of what B owes to A 
regarding O tracks the moral importance of A’s interest in O, the feasible ways for B to respect or 
promote A’s access to O, and the subset of such feasible forms of respect and promotion that do 
not involve morally unacceptable burdens on B or others (given the importance of their own 
interests) and on A (given the importance of other interests of A besides that concerning access to 
O). The specification and justification of A’s right is coterminous with the specification and 
justification of B’s (and other duty-bearers’) duties. No right is justified only by considering what 
would benefit A. Even if access to O would greatly benefit A, A does not have a right to O 
against B if B cannot feasibly affect A’s access to O, or could only do it in advantageous ways to 
A by incurring unreasonable costs. As we identify B’s duties to A, we can also factor in 
additional moral considerations such as responsibility and fairness. Sometimes the fact that A’s 
lack of access to O has resulted from blamable voluntary choices by A may diminish B’s 
obligations; sometimes B’s obligation may be more stringent if A’s lack of access to O is the 
result of what B has blamably done; and sometimes the computation of the extent of sacrifice B 
can reasonably incur in supporting A has to include what other agents C can and should do. 
 The kind of holistic assessment just mentioned would also help capture the multiple 
considerations that can go into the identification and justification of rights and duties of justice. 
These may depend on associative concerns (such as those regarding justification of coercion, 
reciprocity in economic cooperation, equity in relations of production and political decision-
making so that exploitation and domination are avoided). My rejection of a definitional reduction 
of the concept of justice to associative responsibilities does not deny that justice includes them. 
Its point is to prevent a definitional suppression of other responsibilities of justice that are not 
associative (as arguably at least some human rights based ones are). 
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 Rights of justice, as I acknowledged, cannot simply be articulated by reference to the demand 
side (the interests of right-holders). We also need to illuminate the perspective of duty-bearers. 
But we do not need to assume as a conceptual matter the substantive view that the demand side 
can never, as it were, outstrip the general negative duties and special associative responsibilities 
of suppliers. A substantive view of justice as responding positively (within the limits of what is 
reasonably feasible) to the important interests of outsiders is a lively option that must be taken 
into account and engaged in normative argument. There are views of justice as reduced to duties 
not to take goods away from others, or as only recognizing frameworks of cooperation in which 
every participant “breaks even” (never giving more than they receive), or as deepening mutual 
service (when it goes beyond strict equivalence) only when it happens among people already 
wrapped in the flag of a particular nation, state, or common economic venture. But these views 
are just some candidates among others. They have to face the alternatives rather than outsource 
the concerns those alternatives articulate to the realm of beneficence. 
 What would be lost if such concerns are indeed outsourced to the realm of beneficence? What 
would be lost, I think, is the opportunity to see how those concerns may affect the content, 
existence, and weight of the negative and associative duties that we already accept. Expanding 
the circle of justice forces us to seek more perspicuous, integrated, and practically lucid pictures 
of what we owe to each other.32 We should take everyone’s important interests to heart before 
deciding whether we can permissibly see some of them as giving rise only to weaker or 
supplementary calls on our charity. 
(6) How significant is the discussion about the distinction between justice and beneficence? Why 
should we care about what does and what does not belong to justice?33 Perhaps we could do all 
the theoretical work we need to do if we drop reference to justice and beneficence and simply talk 
about the different reasonable moral demands we can make on each other: some negative, some 
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positive; some grounded in rights, some not; some institutionally articulated, some interpersonal; 
some associative, some general; etcetera. We could simply identify these different demands, their 
mutual constraints, and their relative weight in different domains of application. What is crucial, 
it might be said, is that we have a clear picture of the different duties that capture what we owe to 
each other, their content, relation, and weight. Whether we call them duties of justice or 
beneficence is immaterial. 
 On reflection, I think that we should keep referring to justice (construed as I suggest) as 
different from beneficence for four reasons. A first reason is pragmatic. The invocation of the 
distinction between justice and beneficence is pervasive in moral and political theory and 
practice. A call for dropping the terms “justice” and “beneficence” is not likely to succeed. 
Furthermore, it is common to say that demands of justice are more important than, or have 
priority over, demands of beneficence. If we want to make sure that certain important demands 
(such as those that are positive, and go beyond state-based associative reasons) are not 
downplayed or made to wait, it is wise to construe them as part of justice. It could be replied that 
if the distinction between justice and beneficence, with its in-built hierarchy, is bound to remain, 
it is also likely to fail to include the capacious view of justice that I recommend. Is not that view 
arbitrary in any case? The answer (and this is my second point) is that the construal I offered is 
not arbitrary. As I said at the outset, it is not a mere elucidation, and so it is not meant to simply 
report current usage. But no view that merely reports current usage will be satisfactory because 
there is no thoroughly agreed upon usage anyway. So we need a constructive proposal. The 
proposal I offer, on the other hand, is not a mere stipulation. It builds upon ideas of rights and 
enforceability, which are in fact quite central to the actual practice of moral and political debate 
(even if it construes them in a specific way). 
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 Third, my proposal about how to construe justice meets the five reasonable desiderata. It helps 
us identify stringent demands, enables us to engage in important substantive debates, is tolerably 
determinate, helps us fulfill the critical role of considerations of justice, and makes it possible to 
clarify the stakes in important contemporary debates about justice (especially about global 
justice). A concept of justice with those virtues is worth using. Finally, although capacious, my 
account of justice does not swallow all putative demands of beneficence.34 Some of those 
demands are in fact absorbed by justice (as is the case with easy rescues attending to urgent 
needs35), but others remain beyond justice (as is the case with some ways of benefitting others 
that cannot plausibly be construed as responding to prima facie entitlements). My account 
enables the grasp of the wealth of reasons of justice, but it also honors the widespread intuition 
that there are some ways of making the life of others better that are not demanded by justice. We 
do need a separate conceptual domain for beneficence. 
(7) Another worry about my account of duties of justice is that it fails to capture the relational 
nature of justice and the active dimension of persons. The account seems to be non-relational but 
instead focused on end-states and it seems to see those states as befalling persons in a passive 
way. The account, it might be said, is fixated on the issue of what some person A gets. But it 
should, instead, focus on how another person B treats A, on what kinds of relations exist between 
A and B, and on what A and B have done to each other. Access to goods is an important, but 
subordinate dimension. Justice should range over persons as related and active agents, not over 
persons as isolated and passive recipients. Otherwise, we cannot capture the difference between 
B’s duties toward A if the disadvantage experienced by A is the result of a natural disaster and 
when it is the result of relations of economic or political exploitation or domination imposed by 
B. B’s action to help improve A’s condition is, in the first case, a matter of charity, whereas in 
the second it is a matter of justice proper.36 Besides illuminating the involvement of B, we must 
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also consider the agency of A and ponder whether A deserves B’s support, and what kind of 
support is fitting if A is to function as an independent person. 
 This worry captures two important intuitions, but does not debunk my broad account of 
justice. The intuitions are that it matters for justice how circumstances of advantage and 
disadvantage result from social relations, and that it also matters that people see themselves and 
each other in those relations as active agents with power and responsibility. But those intuitions 
can be captured without surrendering the approach proposed. If B helps A to overcome the 
penury resulting from a natural disaster, B could be adopting a certain relational stance toward A, 
one in which the penury of another human being may trigger an obligation of support. We should 
construe the idea of a relational stance capaciously. It may include associative concerns about 
non-exploitation and non-domination, and general negative duties to avoid undue harm. But it 
may also involve a general commitment not to let fellow human beings down when they are stuck 
in penury. Some forms of moral solidarity might be duties of justice (while others, of course, 
might be duties of beneficence: for example, we may have a duty of justice to help provide 
clothes to the destitute, but we might have only a duty of beneficence to give them their favorite 
clothes37). In such cases, when we consider others’ states of disadvantage we do not only ask 
“Have I done that to them?” or “Was it my fault?” We also ask “May I allow that to go on?” or 
“May I let that happen to them?” Injustice may be done to others through indifference. 
 Several issues of agency are of course important. Resources for support do not normally 
materialize without being the result of productive efforts by some agents (thus the reference to 
fairness to duty-bearers mentioned in 4(5) above). And those helped are not to be seen as mere 
passive receptacles of beneficial stuff, but as agents who could be participants in their own 
amelioration38 (and sometimes morally responsible for bringing about their own disadvantage). 
But we can, and on some substantive views of justice we should, also pay attention to the 
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significance of need and mutual dependency. A radical ideal of independence is arguably 
infeasible and undesirable. It is part of what persons are that they need the support of others to 
avoid the bad and the wrong and to pursue the good and the right. We can, and arguably we 
should, relate to each other so as to respond to that vulnerability with solidarity. Persons are not 
merely passive recipients, but they are passive to an important extent. They should not have to 
feel humiliated if they are helped, and they should not have to feel guilt when they help others. 
We can capture these points by acknowledging (multiply qualified) general rights and duties of 
justice of mutual support. 
(8) I conclude these reflections by considering briefly one of the hardest issues in the discussion 
about the idea of justice: How do we identify the difference between a concept and a conception? 
Is this difference sharp or porous? A view I find worth entertaining is that this difference is in 
fact not tight. We can see the concept of justice as marking a territory of debate that is valuable to 
identify and explore. But the boundaries of that territory depend on our substantive interest in 
areas of it, and in our concern for engaging each other in its examination even if we disagree 
about the content of the important areas. On this view, our conceptual commitments are partly 
driven by our substantive normative beliefs. The former are meant to help us articulate, voice, 
and assess the latter. But why include in a concept the possibility of a conception one considers 
false? Because (inter alia) one has a quite general, substantive commitment to engage other 
human beings in argument about what we owe to each other. To do this, we need conceptual 
tools that allow us to work (and also quarrel) together. 
 I realize that this picture of the debate about concept and conceptions of justice may assume a 
humanist cosmopolitan commitment to the framing importance of equal respect and concern for 
all human persons. But if one cannot fully disengage concept from conception at some point, this 
seems a point worth resting at. 
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to provide those resources.” An example of contrast VI appears in Tan (2004, p.21). Tan actually focuses on the 
related question of the distinction between “justice” and “ethics,” claiming (on the basis of an interpretation of 
Rawls’s theory of justice) that the former has an “institutional focus” while the latter has an “interactional focus.” 
Tan distinguishes his view from Pogge’s view, according to which an “institutional approach not only has an 
institutional focus, but it also has an institutional basis or justification,” and he does not “share the justificatory 
claim in Pogge’s approach that we have duties of justice only in so far as we are causally via our institutions 
responsible for injustices” (Ibid.). For Pogge’s view, see his (2008). Rawls (1999b, pp. 195ff.) contrasts distributive 
justice and humanitarian assistance. Contrast VII is embraced by the majority of philosophers in the current debate 
on global justice (although the normatively relevant forms of association are characterized in different ways—see 
notes 27-28 below). For challenges to it see, however, Caney (2011) and Gilabert (2012, chs. 5-6). My discussion 
focuses on contemporay debates. For historical explorations, see Fleischacker (2004); and Nussbaum ((2000). 
5 Gilabert (2012, pp. 11-8). This paper differs from that earlier text in the following ways: an account of deliberative 
interpretive proposals is advanced, the characterization of justice is changed to include reference to access to goods 
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and conditions rather than merely to advantages, the list of desiderata is explicitly stated and is expanded to include 
determinateness and illumination of practices, the contrast Associative / Non-associative is added, the arguments 
defending the proposed characterization of justice are rephrased to make them sharper and additional arguments are 
advanced. The final section of this paper takes the discussion further by addressing possible challenges and by 
providing further elaborations of the proposed characterization of justice. Finally, this paper does not endorse a 
deflationary conclusion about the importance of the distinction between justice and beneficence. 
6 Swift (2006, p. 6). 
7 Nozick (1981, pp. 498-504). As Francisco Garcia Gibson pointed out to me, considerations about costs to agents 
may affect duties of justice in different ways (e.g. by impacting their content, weight, or enforceability). 
8 Rawls (1999, pp. 266-7). 
9 See, e.g., Van Parijs (2007, p. 641). 
10 For the libertarian view, see Nozick (1974) and Narveson (1988). 
11 Buchanan (1987, pp. 562-9). 
12 Rawls (1999a, pp. 249-51, 291-2). 
13 Miller (2007, p. 249). 
14 Cohen (2008, ch. 3). See also Sen (2009, pp. x-xi, 10, 67-9, 75-86). 
15 See Cohen (2002). See also Rawls, (1999a,  sect. 41). 
16 Another instructive example is Gramsci’s view that socialist transformations in Western democratic societies are 
only likely to succeed if socialist activists manage to make their values and demands hegemonic within the sphere 
of civil society before they find realization through state action. See Gramsci’s discussion on the phenonemon of 
hegemony within civil society in Gramsci (2000, pp. 195, 205-6, 211-2, 249, 306-7, 333-4, 345). 
17 A similar skepticism might partly explain why it is a good thing that the Convention for the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women ranges over “the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other 
field” (Article 1). Part of the difficulty of this discussion turns on how to handle the distinction between what 
contitutes and what causes justice. See Cohen (2008, pp. 377-81). 
18 I agree with Waldron (1993, pp. 25, 212) that rights generate “waves of duties” of many kinds. 
19 On the role of courts in getting the political process to acknowledge and specify rigths see Gauri & Brinks (2012). 
20 Rawls (1999a, pp. 99, 293-4). 
21 The natural duty of justice has another part that concerns the obligation to support existing just schemes. A critic 
might say that this part connects only to perfect obligations. But this would be a mistake. One aspect of the duty to 
support just schemes, the obligation to obey just laws, is a perfect duty. But the members of a just scheme have a 
wider, imperfect obligation to actively engage in activities that help keep the just arrangements alive, such as voting 
(when it is not legally mandatory), participating in political parties, public debates, etc. 
22 For elucidation and exploration of the category of “dynamic duties,” see Gilabert (2009; 2011b). 
23 Shue (1988); Gilabert (2010). 
24 Furthermore, institutional structures sometimes create certain roles, and thus give rise to specific interests and 
responsibilities (Leif Wenar, “Justice and Charity. Rawls, Roles, and Rights”—Talk delivered in the wokshop 
“Justice and Beneficence.” Princeton University, 9 November 2012). 
25 These arrangements would include certain conventions (including those of language). These are of course, in one 
sense of the term, “institutional facts.” But I am here focusing on more formalized institutions whose rules are 
shaped and applied in a way that involves top-down command, without requiring the direct consent and control on 
the part of (at least some of) their subjects when they are applied. 
26 For a historical study of the emergence of this idea, from Babeuf to Rawls (and their surrounding political 
contexts), see Fleischacker (2004, ch. 3). See also Miller (1999, ch. 1). Miller suggests that socialist challenges to 
capitalism played an important role in the emergence of the contemporary idea of “social justice” (p. 3). On 
socialist justice, see Gilabert (2015). 
27 Nagel (2005). 
28 Cohen & Sabel (2006); Sangiovanni (2007); Miller (2010). 
29 Just as we can recognize agent-neutral besides agent-relative duties in the case of human rights, we can 
acknowledge both kinds of duties in the case of some egalitarian claims. See Buchanan (2004); Caney (2011); 
Gilabert (2012). For a different, “practical” characterization of human rights that does not rely on a humanist 
approach see Beitz (2009). Gilabert (2011a; 2013) argue that the insights in such a view can, and should, be 
combined with the humanist approach. 
	   35	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The problem of the imperfection of duties in fact involves many possibilities depending on what aspect of a duty 
we focus on. The difficulties may be to identify the duties’ corresponding (a) agents, (b) acts or omissions, (c) 
beneficiaries, or (d) circumstances of application. 
31 For other discussions on claimability see the specific proposal by O’Neill (1996), and the criticisms to it by Sen, 
(2004) and Ashford (2007). 
32 This does not involve obliterating the distinctions between different kinds of duties of justice (negative and 
positive, general and associative, and the different varieties of each). They can and should all be articulated. The 
key point is that their mutual relations become an explicit and necessary target of discussion. 
33 Cohen (2008, pp. 289-90 n.14) reports Joseph Raz’s puzzlement on this score. Some authors claim that the 
reference to justice does not add anything fundamental to a full account of moral duties, and that it is in fact wholly 
derivative. See Kagan (1998, pp. 176-7) and Buchanan (1987, pp. 574-5). 
34 It also does not obliterate (and in fact invites the grasp of) different reasons of justice. See note 32 (and 
surrounding text). 
35 Thus, Peter Singer construes the positive duty to help reduce global poverty as a matter of beneficence (on the 
basis of the famous analogy with the duty to rescue a child drowning in a shallow pond). See Singer (1972). But we 
can construe this positive duty as a demand of justice. We could then preempt the common reaction (for example by 
officials of governments of wealthy nations) that attending to this duty must wait until other, more stringent 
demands of justice have been taken care of first. 
36 Forst (2012, p. 4). 
37 I owe this example to Peter Singer (who does not, however, support my account of the distinction between justice 
and beneficence). 
38 I think that this should include recognizing a right to participate in the political regulation of practices of 
production and distribution. For this important point see Forst (2012,p. 4). 
